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Over the past few years, remittances have become 
the Holy Grail of development studies. The massive 
amounts of capital sent by migrant workers to their 
countries of origin appear to bridge many gaps 
in developing countries, particularly with regard 
to f inancing problems that neither foreign direct 
investment nor development aid can address. There 
is no consensus, however, as to the actual impact of 
remittances on development. While optimists view them 
as the best way to spur economic growth and improve 
well-being in the world’s poorest countries, pessimists 
regard them as yet another form of dependence which 
may make matters worse for receiving countries. As 
is always the case with such questions, the truth lies 
somewhere between these two extremes and largely 
depends on the social and economic situation of the 
receiving country, as well as the manner in which 
remittances are handled. 
The Colombian experience offers particularly 
useful insights into the impact of remittances on 
development. The latter have increased rapidly over 
the last few years, and their economic importance is 
also growing. Studies on the subject have multiplied as 
well, perhaps faster than remittances themselves. The 
issue remains surrounded by controversy, however. The 
purpose of this article is to provide a detailed analysis 
of the economic and social effects of remittances and to 
underscore the potential long-term risks these currency 
flows entail.
Accordingly, section II analyses trends in 
remittances in Colombia over the last few years, paying 
special attention to their importance to the country’s 
economy. An effort is also made to understand the 
socioeconomic characteristics of those who send and 
receive remittances. Section III provides an assessment 
of remittances in Colombia which shows that, while 
they may help to improve the situation of the country, 
they also entail a number of costs that may, in the long 
term, be detrimental to its economy. Consequently, 
public policy should not focus solely on reducing the 
cost of sending remittances or channelling them towards 
investment in production. Rather, it must provide 
viable development alternatives to reduce the country’s 




An overview of remittances in Colombia
1. A classification of remittances
Remittances may be broadly defined as the portion 
of migrants’ available income which they send back 
to their countries of origin. These funds can be 
transferred in a number of ways (see figure 1). In 
addition to official remittances, which are transferred 
through banks and currency-exchange businesses, 
migrants employ a variety of informal channels which 
enable them to lower the cost of international financial 
transfers. An informal remittance market dominated by 
ethnic shops and locutorios (migrant service businesses 
offering cheap international phone calls and other 
communication services) has thus arisen in the main 
urban centres that receive large inflows of migrants. 
In addition to their main business, the owners of these 
shops also transfer funds for a lower fee than financial 
institutions charge.
Another informal channel is the creation of a 
bank account in the receiving country. An emigrant 
regularly transfers money to this account, and his 
or her relatives withdraw the desired amounts from 
an atm, using a debit card supplied by the migrant. 
While these remittances do travel through the formal 
financial system, they are difficult to include in official 
statistics, since they are not recorded as interpersonal 
money transfers. Oftentimes, however, the best way 
to lower or even eliminate transaction costs is to 
use personal networks —friends or family members 
travelling to the country of origin who agree to carry 
cash back with them. Migrants themselves also carry 
a portion of their remittances with them when they go 
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on vacation or when they permanently resettle in their 
countries of origin.
While remittances are essentially monetary in 
nature, transfers in kind represent an additional means 
of transmitting part of a migrant’s income. Trips to the 
country of origin are thus employed as an opportunity 
to bring gifts to family members. E-commerce has also 
become an increasingly common transfer mechanism. 
Migrants purchase goods for their families back home 
directly from the Internet.
The large number of channels through which 
remittances are conveyed makes the phenomenon 
difficult to measure. According to the World Bank, half of 
all remittances worldwide go unreported (Ratha, 2005), 
making it even more difficult to measure their impact 
on development in receiving countries. Notwithstanding 
these difficulties, this article will attempt to assess the 
possible economic and societal repercussions of the 
massive inflow of remittances into Colombia. In order 
to do so, trends in remittances in Colombia over the 
past few years must first be analysed.
2. the massive growth of remittances
Colombia has a long tradition of migration. After the 
country’s participation in the Korean War, the United 
States opened its borders to Colombian workers 
through the Bracero Programme, and those workers 
then contributed to the economic expansion of the 
United States during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 
1970s and 1980s, about 500,000 Colombians settled 
in Venezuela, where labour demand had risen sharply 
following the oil boom of the 1970s. Migration also 
increased significantly during the 1990s as a result of 
both armed conflict and an economic crisis.
Armed conflict in the country has helped increase 
migration for three main reasons. Firstly, clashes 
between the participants in this conflict (guerrilla, 
paramilitary and regular forces) have compelled the 
civilian population —particularly campesinos— to flee 
combat zones and seek refuge in peaceful areas, either 
in the country’s main cities or abroad. Secondly, the 
threats which many Colombian families have received 
from belligerents in the conflict have driven them into 
exile as a means of escaping their pursuers. Thirdly, this 
war against civil society has taken a high economic toll. 
Colombians are indirectly affected by political violence 
through the economic crisis and unemployment it has 
generated. The economic crisis worsened considerably 
during the second half of the 1990s, leading to a strong 
surge in migration.
As a result of this massive migration process, 
approximately 3.3 million Colombians —8% of the 
country’s overall population— live abroad, according 
to 2005 census data (DANE, 2006).1 Women make up 
51.4% of the migrant population, and the median age 
of Colombians living abroad is 25.4 years. Migrants 
come mainly from the Valle del Cauca (24.1% of all 
Colombian migrants), Bogotá (18.7%), Antioquía 
(11.9%), Risaralda (7.8%) and Atlántico (6.6%). Their 
main destination countries are the United States (35.4% 
of all migrants), Spain (23.3%), Venezuela (18.5%), 
Ecuador (2.4%) and Canada (2.2%).
This strong upsurge in migration2 has led to a 
sharp increase in remittances to Colombia over the last 
few years. Between 1995 and 2006, official remittances 
increased almost five-fold, from US$ 809 million in 1995 
to US$ 3.89 billion in 2006. This makes Colombia the 
third-largest recipient of remittances in Latin America, 
after Mexico and Brazil (see table 1). In Colombia, 
however, remittances do not account for as high a share 
of gdp (3.3% in 2005) as they do in other countries 
FIGURE 1
Classification of remittances














1 The results of the 2005 census are available at the following website: 
http://www.dane.gov.co/censo/.
2 According to estimates prepared by the National Administrative 
Department of Statistics (DANE), the number of Colombians living 
abroad was 1.7 million in 1990, 1.9 million in 1995 and 2.3 million 
in 2000.
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in the region such as Jamaica (19.0%), Haiti (20.7%) 
and Honduras (21.2%). Measured as a share of gdp, 
the level of remittances is higher in Colombia than it 
is in Brazil, however (1.1%), or in Mexico (2.8%). It 
has also increased over time (see table 2). Remittances 
represented only 1% of the country’s gdp and 6.9% of 
its exports in 1990; as of 2005, these figures had risen 
to 3.3% and 15.9%, respectively.
As of 2006, remittances were the second most 
important item in the country’s current account, behind 
petroleum but before coal, coffee, ferronickel and 
emeralds (see figure 2). For three years, from 2002 to 
2004, they also exceeded foreign direct investment (see 
figure 3). The gap between the two was at its widest 
in 2003, when Colombia took in US$ 3.06 billion in 
remittances, compared to only US$ 1.758 billion in 
foreign direct investment. In 2005, on the other hand, 
foreign direct investment (US$ 10.255 billion) far 
exceeded remittances (US$ 3.314 billion). This was 
mainly a result of the sale of Bavaria group to the 
British-South-African company sabMiller for US$ 8 
billion. In 2006, foreign direct investment exceeded 
remittances, although the gap between the two shrank 
considerably. This reflects the highly cyclical nature of 
foreign direct investment. Remittances, in contrast, are 
much more stable.
TABLE 1
Latin America:  remittances, 200
Country Millions of dollars Percentage of gdp
 1. Mexico 20 034 2.8
 2. Brazil 6 411 1.1
 3. Colombia 3 314 3.3
 4. Guatemala 2 993 9.3
 5. El Salvador 2 830 17.1
 6. Dominican Republic 2 682 9.1
 7. Peru 2 495 3.2
 8. Ecuador 2 005 6.4
 9. Honduras 1 763 21.2
 10. Jamaica 1 651 19.0
 11. Haiti 1 077 20.7
 12. Bolivia 860 8.5
 13. Nicaragua 850 16.9
 14. Argentina 780 0.4
 15. Paraguay 550 7.2
Total, Latin America 52 608
Source:  Inter-American Development Bank (idb, 2006).
TABLE 2
Colombia: Economic importance of remittances
 1990 1995 2000 2005
Remittances (millions of dollars) 488 809 1 578 3 314
Percentage of gdp 1.0 0.9 1.9 3.3
Percentage of exports 6.9 8.0 12.0 15.9
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Banco de la República.
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FIGURE 2
Colombia: main items in current account, 2006
(Millions of dollars)
FIGURE 3
Colombia: remittances and foreign direct investment, 1994-2006
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Banco de la República.
Source: Banco de la República.
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3. senders and receivers of remittances: who 
are they?
Over the past few years, several studies have been carried 
out to develop profiles of those who send and receive 
remittances, as well as to determine the uses to which 
remittances are put. The most notable of these studies 
have been carried out by Garay and Rodriguez (2005) 
and Gaviria and Mejía (2005). The former received 
technical support from the National Administrative 
Department of Statistics (dane), the Colombian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International 
Organization for Migration (iom). The study focuses on 
households in the Área Metropolitana Centro Occidente 
(“Midwestern Metropolitan Area”), which comprises the 
municipalities of Pereira, Dosquebradas and La Virginia, 
in the province of Risaralda. The latter consists of an 
Internet survey which seeks to contribute to a better 
understanding of the behaviour of Colombians abroad.3 
Despite the limitations inherent in such exercises, these 
two studies are a useful source of data for the analysis 
of remittances in Colombia.
According to these surveys, half of total remittances 
come from the United States and one fourth from Spain. 
This roughly matches the geographic distribution of 
Colombian emigrants. About 75% of Colombians 
living abroad send remittances. Most of those who 
do so are recent emigrants. The average monthly 
remittance is somewhere between US$ 240 and 
US$ 300. Remittances tend to be higher during the 
first few years after migration, as migrants’ finances 
improve; they begin to decline after about 10 years as 
families regroup, among other factors. Migrants send 
money to Colombia primarily because members of 
their family (spouse, children, parents) remain there.4 
It should be noted that a migrant’s schooling affects 
the pattern of remittances in two opposite ways. On 
the one hand, better-educated migrants (those who 
have attended university) are less inclined to send 
remittances than those who have only attended high 
school (probably because the families of the former 
have higher incomes). On the other hand, there is a 
positive correlation between the number of years a 
migrant has attended school and the average monthly 
remittance he or she sends home, since better-educated 
migrants tend to earn higher incomes.
The average age of remittance recipients is 40. 
The vast majority of them (76%) are women. Over 
half of them have no steady job and therefore depend 
on remittances as their main source of income. Most 
remittance recipients are, in fact, below the poverty 
line (64% in the Midwestern Metropolitan Area), 
which explains why most of the remittances they 
receive (between 61% and 68%) are spent on recurrent 
expenses, such as food, clothing, rent or utility bills. 
Remittances are also used to cover education and 
health-care costs (10% to 15% each), start businesses 
(4% to 7%), build up savings (4% to 6%) or buy a 
home (3% to 5%).
Generally speaking, the massive increase in 
remittances to Colombia over the past few years has 
helped to significantly improve living conditions for the 
families that receive them, increasing their purchasing 
power and affording them access to a wider range of 
consumer products and health and education services. 
In this respect, the impact of remittances has been 
undeniably positive for households which steadily 
receive this supplemental income. At the national level, 
however, their impact is not as clear. Can remittances 
help finance the development of Colombia? Can these 
capital flows help reduce inequality and improve living 
conditions for the overall population? Or do these 
flows bring with them a risk of dependency that might 
jeopardize the economy in the long run?
3 Gaviria and Mejía (2005), in particular, have developed an index 
of “Colombianness” (or transnationality) which measures a migrant’s 
ties to Colombia. The index consists of six binary variables: 
membership in a Colombian expatriates’ association; sending of 
remittances; receipt of goods from Colombia; continued affiliation 
with a Colombian pension fund; telephone calls to Colombia at 
least twice a week; keeping apprised of events in Colombia via 
television. 
4 The literature on remittances usually draws a distinction between 
two types of motives. One is altruism, or a sense of obligation to 
one’s family. In this case, migration is viewed as a family decision. 
The other motive is risk-sharing. In this case, remittances serve a 
more individualistic purpose, with migrants expecting help from 
their families if circumstances change (particularly if they lose their 
job). In fact, migrants probably send remittances for a mixture of 
altruistic and individualistic reasons.
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Remittances affect many different stakeholders (senders, 
recipients, intermediaries, public authorities and others) 
and therefore have many different implications for the 
economy and for society. In addition to influencing 
the traditional components of aggregate demand, a 
massive inflow of capital can have repercussions on 
prices, exchange rates, the formation of human and 
social capital and income redistribution. Remittances 
also represent a challenge for financial institutions 
seeking to attract those resources, as well as for public 
authorities striving to maximize the benefits and 
minimize the direct and indirect costs of such flows.
1. Domestic demand
One of the main arguments against remittances is that 
they are spent mainly on goods to meet basic needs 
rather than on production. Advocates of this view 
assert that, since the recipients of remittances save very 
little and do not invest in business projects, they do 
not contribute to long-term economic development. It 
should be noted, however, that the spending patterns of 
families that receive remittances are similar to those of 
most other Colombian households; they have nothing 
to do with remittances per se, but are rather a result 
of the living conditions of the overall population. 
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to criticize the use that 
families make of remittances when the main reason 
why migrants send money is to cover their families’ 
basic needs.
In addition, by contributing to an increase 
in consumption —that is, to aggregate demand—
remittances have a multiplier effect on gdp. In fact, 
spending by recipient households spurs demand in 
several sectors of the economy, which then spend 
more. The initial momentum thus has more than a 
proportional impact on economic activity. Considering 
that Colombian households that receive remittances 
have a savings rate of approximately 5% (Garay and 
Rodríguez, 2005), this flow of money has a significant 
multiplier effect. To the extent that trade liberalization 
is already well under way, however, some demand 
is directed towards the consumption of imported 
products, thereby reducing the multiplier effect of 
remittances.5
The construction industry has particularly benefited 
from remittances thanks, on the one hand, to home 
purchases by the families of migrants and, on the other, 
to direct investments in their country by Colombians 
living abroad. Between 1995 and 2005, homebuilding 
costs rose by 181%, while inflation fell by 75% (from 
19.5% in 1995 to 4.9% in 2005), which suggests that 
demand was strong in that sector. Housing fairs in the 
main foreign cities where Colombians have settled, such 
as those held in September 2005 and October 2006 
in New York, in April 2006 in Miami, and in March 
2006 and April 2007 in Madrid,6 have proven to be an 
effective way to connect migrants with the Colombian 
real estate market.
Remittances have also contributed to the creation 
of microenterprises in Colombia, as they have helped to 
mitigate the problems faced by low-income households 
in trying to gain access to loans. Remittances have 
been particularly useful for the purchase of investment 
goods, such as tools for the establishment of small 
businesses. Experience has shown, however, that most 
of these microenterprises are subsistence operations 
in the informal sector and are relatively short-lived. 
One of the main obstacles preventing recipients of 
III
the role of remittances in the
Colombian economy
5 The multiplier effect of remittances may be calculated as 
follows:
	 ∆Y = 1 ∆R
 1- c + m
where ∆Y is the variation of the product generated by remittances, 
∆R is the change in the flow of remittances entering the economy, 
c is the marginal propensity to consume and m is the marginal 
propensity to import.
6 Housing fairs, organized by the Cámara Colombiana de la 
Construcción (Colombian Chamber of Construction, or camacol), 
are designed to steer remittances towards investment in construction 
and real estate. They bring together the Colombian communities 
residing in the area where the fair is held, on the one hand, and 
building and real estate promoters, as well as financial entities, 
on the other. These fairs are supported by iom, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for the Environment, Housing and 
Territorial Development. For further details, see: http://www.camacol.
org.co/htm/index.asp
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remittances from starting their own business is their 
lack of experience. The State should offer technical 
assistance, financial information and training. Training 
programmes could also be offered to migrants in order 
to encourage them to return.7
The massive inflow of remittances has also 
contributed to the growth of a number of activities that 
are related, directly or indirectly, to this phenomenon. 
The rapid growth of the money-transfer and exchange 
business, in particular, is clearly associated with 
migration. The number of branches established by 
Western Union as a commercial money-transfer agent 
rose from 8 in 1996 to 112 in 2006. Similarly, the 
air transport industry, including airlines and travel 
agencies, has experienced strong growth in recent years 
as a result of the increase in the number of Colombians 
living abroad. Many of the new migrants are able to 
travel thanks to the financial support of family members 
living abroad, who pay part or all of their travel costs 
and thus help set up a chain migration process.8
While it is true that remittances have a positive 
effect on economic activity, they also make the 
Colombian economy highly sensitive to migratory 
cycles. There is a strong correlation between emigration 
rates and the volume of remittances. Remittances 
therefore tend to have an anticyclical effect on economic 
activity: when the economy is in recession, emigration 
increases, as does the volume of remittances, helping 
to stimulate the national product. Conversely, a period 
of strong economic growth leads to a decrease in 
emigration flows and thus to a smaller inflow of 
remittances, thereby slowing economic activity. In the 
case of Colombia, there is a strong negative correlation 
(-0.76) between the cyclical deviations of gdp and those 
of remittances for the 1994-2005 period. This confirms 
the anticyclical nature of remittances. The current 
resurgence of economic activity in Colombia9 has been 
accompanied by a decline in emigration, which may, 
over the medium term, lead to a drop in the volume of 
remittances, with the ensuing slowdown of growth.
2. Current account and exchange rate
Remittances can affect the current account in three 
ways. Firstly, they have a direct impact on the balance 
of payments, as they improve the balance of invisibles, 
which is comprised mainly of money transfers. Thus, 
remittances have helped reduce the external imbalance 
of the Colombian economy over the last few years. As 
shown in figure 4, without the money sent by migrants, 
the current account deficit between 1999 and 2006 
would have been worse. In fact, the improvement in 
the current account that occurred between 2002 and 
2004 was basically due to an increase in remittances, 
without which it would have continued along its 
downward path. Similarly, remittances have helped curb 
the deterioration of the current account which has been 
occurring since 2004.
The second impact of remittances on the current 
account involves changes in consumer behaviour. 
Recipients of foreign currency usually adopt ostentatious 
consumption habits, as evidenced in their purchases 
of foreign products such as brand-name clothing or 
household appliances (Terry, 2005). This behaviour 
tends to spread to their neighbours, who do not receive 
remittances but who copy these consumption patterns. 
The effects of “ostentation” and “imitation” lead to an 
increase in imports, a trend that is encouraged by the 
openness of the Colombian economy to trade. Thus, 
between January 2000 and December 2005, imports 
of goods and services rose by 137.8%, while exports 
rose by only 91.2%.
Finally, remittances are likely to have repercussions 
on the current account through their effect on exchange 
rates (figure 5). A large inflow of money can be expected 
to lead to an appreciation of the national currency, 
which may be followed by a loss of competitiveness 
and a deterioration of the current account (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo, 2004). This, in turn, creates the risk 
of “Dutch disease”10 (i.e., a shift of economic activity 
7 In Brazil, for example, the Corporación Official de Apoyo a la 
Pequeña Empresa (State Microenterprise Corporation) and Banco 
do Sul implemented a programme to support enterprises established 
by Brazilian emigrants of Japanese descent who returned to Brazil 
after working for several years in Japan.
8 Chain migration is a cumulative migration process based on family 
ties or ties to a common place of origin. Those who first attempt 
migration help feed migration flows by providing information on 
opportunities in the receiving country, sending money to cover 
the travel costs of future migrants, offering lodging and logistical 
support to new migrants and facilitating job contacts or access to 
social services.
9 With a gdp growth rate of over 4% since 2003 (as of 2006 it was 
6.0%), Colombia has achieved better results than its Latin American 
neighbours (5.3% on average in 2006). The country’s unemployment 
rate fell from an average of 17.7% in 2002 to 12.6% in 2006.
10 “Dutch disease” takes its name from the negative consequences 
of the discovery and exploitation of natural gas in the Netherlands 
during the 1960s. A large inflow of capital leads to a strong trade 
surplus, which causes the real exchange rate to appreciate and thus 
hurts the competitiveness of the tradable goods sector. The economy 
becomes revenue-based, and the structure of production is distorted 
in favour of non-tradable goods.
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FIGURE 4
Colombia: current account, 1999-2006
(Millions of dollars)
FIGURE 5
Colombia: exchange rate and remittances, 199-2006
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Banco de la República.
Source: Banco de la República.
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towards non-tradable goods as exporters become 
discouraged). The massive flow of remittances into 
Colombia in recent years has probably contributed to 
the strong appreciation of its currency. Thus, between 
March 2003 and April 2007, the peso fell by 28% with 
respect to the dollar.
It is difficult, however, to establish a direct link 
between remittances and the exchange rate. In the 
first place, although the share of the current account 
represented by remittances has increased, oil is still 
the country’s chief export, and the rise in prices of 
this raw material has had a greater impact on the 
exchange rate than remittances have. Similarly, the 
high level of foreign investment in Colombia in recent 
years, which is partly attributable to the acquisition 
of Colombian f irms by large foreign groups, has 
contributed significantly to the appreciation of the 
peso. Furthermore, if remittances were the factor that 
was responsible for the appreciation of the Colombian 
currency, the peso would have appreciated many years 
ago. As shown in figure 5, remittances and the exchange 
rate both rose, side by side, until March 2003. This 
disproves the argument that remittances affect the 
exchange rate. On the contrary, it could be argued that 
the depreciation of the peso has encouraged migrants 
to send remittances, since every dollar or euro they 
send means more cash for recipient families. It would 
appear, therefore, that the idea of remittances causing 
Dutch disease in Colombia can be discarded, at least 
for the time being.
3. the labour market
The net impact of remittances on the labour market 
is ambiguous, as they may reduce the unemployment 
rate without necessarily improving the employment 
situation. Remittances can, in fact, have an income 
substitution effect since, by driving the reservation 
wage11 up, they may discourage recipients from seeking 
work and thus reduce unemployment. In many cases, 
monthly remittances (which average between 585,000 
and 680,000 pesos, at an exchange rate of 2,260 pesos to 
the dollar as of late 2006) actually exceed the minimum 
wage in Colombia (408,000 pesos as of 2006). In a way, 
this has created a “culture of idleness”, particularly in 
regions —such as the coffee belt— that export the most 
labour. The fact that a growing number of remittance 
recipients are withdrawing from the labour market may 
lead to a drop in the unemployment rate.
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of remittances 
on the labour market. L represents labour, while W 
represents the real wage. OL and DL represent labour 
supply and demand, respectively. W1 represents the 
equilibrium wage without remittances. The reservation 
wage is assumed to equal W1. What happens when 
remittances enter the equation? The reservation wage 
(Wres) climbs above W1, which means that a fraction of 
workers are failing to find work. This leads to increased 
unemployment (the difference between OL
1 and DL, or 
U1). But remittances also help reduce the labour supply 
(as OL
1 shifts to OL
2), as they encourage idleness. The 
result is lower unemployment (U1 to U2) and higher 
wages (W1 to W2). While increased wages do improve 
living conditions for workers, they also raise production 
costs for businesses. This may have a negative impact 
on competitiveness.
The decline in the unemployment rate in Colombia 
since 2000 (from an average of 20.2% in the country’s 
seven main metropolitan areas in 2000 to 12.6% 
in 2006) partially confirms the foregoing analysis. 
The massive exodus of migrants which began in the 
mid-1990s had, in fact, already helped to significantly 
reduce unemployment, either because a portion of the 
unemployed population left the country, or because those 
who were employed and left (due to safety concerns, or 
in search of better working conditions) created vacancies 
11 The reservation wage is the minimum wage an individual requires 












impact of remittances on the labour market
Source: Author’s calculations.
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upon their departure. The withdrawal from work of 
some members of recipient families —particularly in 
the coffee belt (Garay and Rodriguez, 2005)— has 
also helped lower the country’s unemployment rate. 
Notwithstanding the above, it is difficult to determine 
the precise extent to which lower unemployment is 
directly (migration of part of the active population) 
or indirectly (impact of remittances) attributable to 
migration. The recovery of the Colombian economy 
over the past few years has, of course, played a role 
in improving the labour market. Without migration, 
however, unemployment rates today would probably 
be higher.
4. Prices
In terms of prices, remittances bring with them a 
high risk of inflation. A massive influx of capital has 
a direct impact on the money supply, driving prices 
upward. Since Colombian businesses are, as shown in 
figure 7, suffering the consequences of an increase in 
real wages, there is a temptation to raise the end prices 
of their products. This would entail a risk of supply-
side inflation. Remittances also lead to an increased 
demand for non-tradable goods, which are free from 
international competition and are therefore more likely 
to rise in price in response to stronger demand. This, 
in turn, would fuel demand-side inflation.
It should be noted, however, that the appreciation 
of the Colombian peso, for which remittances are 
partly responsible, has made foreign imports cheaper, 
leading to a process of imported disinflation which 
partially offsets the inflationary effects of remittances. 
Most importantly, the Banco de la República has 
implemented a strict inflation-control policy based on 
an inflation targeting strategy. This may explain why 
the Colombian economy has been free of inflationary 
tensions over the last few years, despite renewed 
economic activity and a massive inflow of remittances 
(see figure 7).
. the financial system
The rapid increase in remittances in Colombia has 
drawn the interest of a growing number of financial 
institutions which are attracted by potential profits in 
FIGURE 7
Colombia: remittances and inflation, 1991-2006
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this market. This has led to keener competition among 
money-exchange firms and banks seeking to capture 
emigrant capital. This, in turn, has helped to boost 
the competitiveness and functional efficiency12 of 
financial intermediaries. Heightened competitiveness 
benefits the Colombian economy in two ways. Firstly, 
lower intermediation costs represent a net gain for 
households that receive remittances. Table 3 traces 
changes in remittance costs from Spain to Colombia 
through several different companies. In most cases 
(11 out of 16), costs fell considerably, and the average 
ratio between remittance costs and the sums remitted 
dropped from 7.09%, in March 2005, to 6.32% one 
year later. This is equivalent to a reduction of -10.9% 
over the course of one year. Secondly, the enhanced 
productivity of money-exchange firms and banks has 
increased the productivity of the Colombian financial 
system, which should help raise the rate of capital 
formation in Colombia.
Another way in which remittances have a 
significant effect on the financial system is by expanding 
Colombians’ access to banking services. Table 4 lists 
several indicators of “bankarization” (expanded access 
to banking services for the population) in Colombia. 
While it is true that the number of bank accounts has not 
increased sharply over the last few years, more and more 
Colombians have acquired bank cards, which accounts 
for the rapid development of the country’s atm network 
(the number of atms in the country increased five-fold 
between 1993 and 2004). Since banks tend to be safer 
than other formal channels, recipient households’ degree 
of bankarization appears to be on the rise.
Notwithstanding the above, “financial democracy”, 
or increased popular access to financial services, 
remains quite limited (Terry, 2005). This is particularly 
true of banking services in Colombia,13 especially 
among poorer families that receive remittances mainly 
through money-exchange businesses or other informal 
TABLE 3
Colombia: cost of sending remittances from spaina
Company name  March 2005 March 2006
Latinoenvíos 6.87 4.16
Giroexpress 7.95 4.73
Unigiros Express 6.99 4.73
Maccorp Exact Change 8.54 4.83
Uno Money Transfers 5.19 4.91
Changepoint 7.63 5.27
United Europhil 6.93 5.37
Master Envíos Unidos 6.27 5.79
Safe Money Transfer Spain 5.12 6.30
Envía Telecomunicaciones 6.69 6.78
Geomil Transfer 8.37 6.93
Foreign Exchange Company 8.30 7.32
Interenvíos Money Transfers 5.81 7.38
Telegiros 7.47 7.82
Cambios Sol 8.39 8.13
R.D. Money Transfer 6.88 1.60
Average 7.09 6.32
Source: www.remesas.org
a Remesas.org publishes an assessment of remittance costs twice a year. This assessment is based on a survey of remittance firms approved 
by the Banco de España. The survey consists of a telephone inquiry regarding the cost of sending 150 euros to northern Bogotá. Remittance 
costs correspond to the percentage of money withheld by the remittance firm.
12 Functional efficiency may be defined as the ability of financial 
intermediaries to perform their functions at the lowest possible 
cost.
13 As of 2003, Colombia possessed 9.6 atms for every 100,000 
inhabitants. By way of comparison, the ratio for Latin American 
countries was 5.9 in Peru, 6.3 in Ecuador, 12.8 in Costa Rica, 14.9 
in Argentina, 16.6 in Mexico and Venezuela, 17.8 in Brazil, 20.2 in 
Guatemala and 24.0 in Chile. In industrialized countries, the ratio 
was 42.5 in the United Kingdom, 67.2 in Italy, 70.3 in France, 113.8 
in Japan, 120.9 in the United States and 126.6 in Spain (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2005).
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channels. The involvement of the Bank of the Republic 
in the remittance process, using an approach similar to 
that of the Banco de México, may help increase access 
to banking services and reduce remittance costs.14 
Financial education campaigns may also be required 
to make recipient families aware of the importance 
of employing formal banking services. Information 
regarding the remittance market should also be 
improved, in order to ensure that the agents involved 
are better acquainted with the relevant legislation, 
entities and services. Information must be developed 
to ensure greater transparency in the financial system, 
as well as greater trust in that system, which should 
increase access to banking services. Such access is 
essential if the savings derived from remittances are 
to be invested in production.
Finally, the massive influx of remittances into 
Colombia raises the delicate issue of money laundering. 
Drug traffickers have developed a laundering technique 
known as “smurfing”, whereby large sums of money 
are funnelled through transactions below the maximum 
authorized by the monetary authorities, in order to 
elude detection. International transfers are made to 
beneficiaries, who then receive a commission. It is 
difficult, of course, to distinguish family remittances from 
smurfing operations. These transactions are probably 
limited, however, since they require coordinated action 
on the part of many accomplices, and beneficiaries must 
be changed regularly to avoid suspicion (Cadena and 
Cárdenas, 2004). The country’s monetary authorities 
(Bank of the Republic) and financial authorities (Office 
of the Bank Examiner), acting through the System for 
the Prevention and Control of Asset Laundering (sipla) 
and the Financial Information and Analysis Unit (uiaf), 
have implemented regulatory and supervisory measures 
that significantly reduce the risk of money laundering 
through international transfers.
6. Public finance
Despite the abolishment, in 2005, of the tax-at-source 
which had previously been levied on international 
transfers, remittances probably have a positive impact 
on public finance. They are, in fact, still subject to a 
number of taxes. The value added tax (vat) is applied 
to currency exchange operations, increasing their cost. 
Financial movements in Colombia are also subject to 
a 0.4% tax, which must be paid by anyone receiving 
transfers from abroad. The same tax applies whenever an 
agent withdraws money from an account. Consequently, 
migrants sending money to their families through a bank 
must pay a transaction tax, in addition to the transaction 
costs and the 0.4% tax when the recipients make use 
of the funds. This has increased the volume of taxes 
collected by the State, thereby improving its revenue.
It should be noted that these taxes constitute a 
loss for households which receive remittances, and are 
partly responsible for keeping a fraction of those flows 
outside of the official financial system. In addition, 
the tax regime applied to remittances is regressive, 
since most of their recipients belong to lower social 
strata. Burdensome taxes come at a cost, both in terms 
of economic efficiency and social justice. A strong 
TABLE 4
Colombia: bankarization indicators, 1993-2004
 1993 2000 2004
Active current accounts 2 067 629 1 970 623 2 203 390
Active savings accounts … 12 893 804 12 893 263
Active debit cards 3 500 000 7 925 022 10 277 353
Active credit cards 1 200 000 1 9442 17 2 812 228
Number of atms  1 207 3 874 5 520
Source: Caballero, Lizarazo and Urrutia (2005).
14 The Fedach system (Federal Reserve Automated Clearing 
House) is based on cooperation between the United States Federal 
Reserve and the Central Bank of Mexico. Emigrants send money 
to their families through a correspondent bank, which employs the 
services of the Federal Reserve, which in turn wires the funds to 
the Bank of Mexico. Recipients then retrieve their funds through 
local correspondent banks. This system offers several advantages 
(Collazos, Montes and Muñoz, 2005). The exchange rate employed 
is more advantageous than that offered by private intermediaries, 
and the remittance fee is lower. Transactions are more secure, 
since they are backed by both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
Mexico. The system also ensures a higher degree of transparency 
than would be possible if several private operators were involved. 
The concentration of transactions in the hands of the monetary 
authorities creates economies of scale which make recipients the 
ultimate winners of the process.
14
iNtErNAtioNAL migrAtioN AND DEvELoPmENt: thE soCioECoNomiC imPACt oF rEmittANCEs iN CoLomBiA  •  DAviD khouDour-CAstérAs
C E P A L  r E v i E w  9 2  •  A u g u s t  2 0 0 7
argument can therefore be made for their abolishment, 
or at least for their reduction.
As mentioned above, the massive influx of 
remittances has increased both domestic demand and 
imports. Remittances have thus become a supplementary 
source of tax revenue, through the vat, on the one hand, 
and customs duties, on the other. Insofar as migration 
reduces unemployment and remittances are a form of 
social protection, they benefit the State by easing the 
burden of social problems. Public spending is lower 
than it would be in the absence of migration, and the 
fiscal deficit is reduced as a result. Thus, between 1999 
and 2004, the deficit of the national central government 
fell from -6.1% to -4.3% of gdp, and the deficit of the 
non-financial public sector fell from -4.1% to -0.9% 
of gdp (see table 5).
Recent imf studies on the impact of remittances 
on development in receiving countries emphasize 
their possible risks for the financial system (Chami, 
Cosimano and Gapen, 2006). By raising the liquidity 
of the financial system, remittances expand access 
to foreign capital, reducing the cost of foreign 
indebtedness. At the same time, this increased liquidity 
raises moral hazard issues, since the terms of credit 
created by remittance flows may generate growing 
public debt. The Colombian economy may find itself 
affected by such forces in the future.
7. human and social capital 
One of the positive effects of remittances on development 
in Colombia has to do with human capital (Kugler, 
2006). A significant portion of these funds are used to 
cover education and health-care costs. Many children 
are able to remain in school, and many poor families 
are able to afford health care, thanks to the financial 
support of a family member abroad. In addition, 
collective remittances (funds raised by emigrant 
associations or channelled through Internet community 
networks) are used to finance large-scale initiatives, 
particularly infrastructure and educational projects. The 
experience of Conexión Colombia,15 a non-governmental 
organization (ngo) which uses the Internet to channel 
money from Colombian emigrants into education, health 
or cultural programmes, is one example of the kind 
of impact that remittances can have in terms of social 
investment. Organizations of this type also contribute 
to the development of social capital16 by encouraging 
the implementation of transnational networks (Guarnizo, 
2003). It should be noted that there is no history of 
cooperation between the Colombian government and 
emigrant associations. In this regard, Colombia differs 
from Mexico, with its Programa Iniciativa Ciudadana 
3x1 (3x1 Citizen Initiative Programme),17 and El 
TABLE 5
Colombia: public finances, 1996-2004
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Fiscal deficit (as % of gdp)
- Central national government -3.4 -3.7 -4.8 -6.1 -5.4 -5.3 -4.9 -4.7 -4.3
- Non-financial public sector -1.7 -2.8 -3.7 -4.1 -4.0 -4.1 -3.5 -2.6 -0.9
Total gross external debt
- In millions of dollars  31 114 34 409 36 681 36 733 36 130 39 109 37 336 38 065 39 460
- As % of exports 236 242 273 263 229 260 263 242 202
Source: eclac (2005).
15 Conexión Colombia operates through the following website: http://
conexioncolombia.terra.com.co/index.jsp. The organization has two 
objectives: first, to strengthen the ties of expatriate Colombians to 
their country by publishing articles on current events in Colombia, 
allowing migrants to write about their experiences and hosting a 
discussion forum; second, to create a safe channel through non-
profit foundations for migrants’ contributions to the financing of 
development efforts in Colombia. Between December 2003 and 
December 2005, Conexión Colombia channelled US$ 2 million to 
22 foundations and other special projects. 
16 According to Coleman (1990), social capital is a public good that 
includes ties of trust between the members of society. It becomes 
manifest particularly through respect for collective commitments, 
which strengthens social cohesion. Social capital has a positive impact 
on other forms of capital, such as human or financial capital.
17 Programa Iniciativa Ciudadana 3x1 was created in Mexico in 
2002. For every dollar invested in a local development project by 
associations of Mexicans living abroad, the Mexican government 
invests an additional three dollars. One dollar comes from the federal 
government, another from the State government and a third from 
the municipality where the project takes place. The 3x1Programme 
has helped fund a wide range of initiatives (Vásquez Mota, 2005), 
including social projects (e.g., rest homes or homes for persons 
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Salvador, with its Unidos por la Solidaridad (United 
for Solidarity) programme.18
Remittances are the flip side of the costs 
associated with migration. The departure of millions 
of Colombians represents a net loss of human capital. 
It is not only a brain drain, but a “body drain” as well. 
Economic growth requires both skilled and unskilled 
labour, and Colombia is currently at a disadvantage on 
both counts. The brain drain is a more serious concern 
at present, since it reflects the removal of part of the 
country’s investment in education.19 The loss is often 
permanent, since most of the students and professionals 
who leave Colombia settle in their destination country.20 
Incentives today are insufficient to persuade talented 
Colombians to return home.
Another problem associated with migration and 
remittances is that, in many cases, migrants are parents 
who have had to leave their children in the care of 
grandparents, aunts or uncles as they travel abroad 
in search of a better life. While the money they send 
their families is often used to finance their children’s 
schooling, those children cannot help but feel abandoned. 
Studies on this issue, particularly in the Colombian 
coffee belt (Garay and Rodríguez, 2005), have shown 
that children whose parents live abroad do not perform 
as well in school and tend to exhibit violent behaviour. 
They join gangs more frequently and may even become 
criminal offenders. It could thus be argued that one 
of the collateral costs of remittances is an erosion of 
social capital. The family is responsible for initiating 
individuals into society and is therefore an essential 
component of social capital (Wilson, 1993). The break-
up of families has a disruptive effect on children and 
may lead to increased criminal behaviour.
8. Poverty and inequality
Aside from their impact on aggregate demand, 
remittances play a social role. Many recipients are, in 
fact, below the poverty line, and the funds they receive 
allow them to improve their living conditions. Garay and 
Rodríguez (2005) have shown that, when remittances 
are factored out of the income of Colombians living 
in the Midwestern Metropolitan Area, poverty and 
indigence levels rise from 59.4% to 64.3% and from 
30% to 34.9%, respectively. Remittances finance social 
protection for the poor and are often the only source 
of income for many retirees who are not covered by 
the national pension system. They also serve as an 
insurance policy of sorts against economic shocks 
(namely, unexpected drops in family income) since 
they tend to remain stable over time.
In this regard, remittances are much more effective 
at reducing poverty than development aid is, since they 
go directly to the families in greatest need, bypassing the 
intermediate channels usually employed by international 
assistance (Terry, 2005). Indeed, both the senders of 
remittances and their recipients have a greater stake 
in making optimal use of these funds than do public 
bodies. Moreover, unlike development aid, remittances 
from family members are untouched by corruption.
A regular inflow of transfers from abroad poses 
several problems, however. In the first place, remittances 
tend to create financial dependency, which may lead to 
difficulties for recipient households if family members 
abroad stop sending money, either temporarily or 
permanently. In addition, remittances can magnify social 
and geographic inequalities. Migration is essentially a 
lower-middle-class phenomenon; it does not extend 
to the poorest households, which lack the financial 
resources to travel abroad. The social gap between 
households that receive remittances and the rest of the 
population becomes wider as a result. Furthermore, 
migrants do not come from the poorest regions of the 
country, such as Chocó, Cauca or Nariño, but rather 
from industrialized areas such as Bogotá, Antioquía 
(Medellín) or the Valle del Cauca (Cali) (Khoudour-
Castéras, 2007a). Remittances are concentrated in these 
areas, making geographic inequalities deeper.
with disabilities, health-care centres), educational projects (schools, 
libraries), cultural projects (museums, cultural centres) and public 
works (road paving, electrification, sewerage).
18 The Salvadoran programme Unidos por la Solidaridad was 
created to coordinate the atni-poverty efforts of the government, 
municipalities, the private sector and associations of Salvadorans 
living abroad. The funds provided by such contributors are 
administered by the Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo 
Local en El Salvador (Social Investment Fund for Local Development 
in El Salvador, or FISDL), which distributes available resources 
through open calls for grant proposals from local communities. 
The programme has channelled incoming remittances into local 
investment projects and has helped to increase the coverage of basic 
social services and infrastructure.
19 Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001) argue that the brain drain 
may help to increase the level of human capital in countries of origin, 
as it creates an incentive to stay in school and take advantage of 
better employment opportunities abroad. Since only a fraction of the 
country’s skilled labour force ultimately migrates, the end result is a 
higher level of human capital than that which existed before the brain 
drain began. Notwithstanding the above, empirical studies show that 
a positive correlation between the departure of skilled workers and 
increased investment in education exists only in a limited number 
of cases (Schiff, 2006).
20 The odds of encountering Latin Americans schooled at the 
secondary level or beyond are 2.5 times higher in the United States 
than they are in their countries of origin.
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In the final analysis, the impact of remittances 
is mixed (see figure 6). While they can, under certain 
circumstances, strengthen economic activity and 
improve the social landscape, they also involve a 
number of risks that could have harmful long-term 
consequences for the development of Colombia. Despite 
their magnitude, the overall impact of remittances tends 
to be very limited. If one divides the overall sum of 
official remittances in 2005 (US$ 3.314 billion) by the 
country’s population (41.2 million), the result is US$ 
0.22 per day, or one fifth of the amount which the World 
Bank has set as an indicator for extreme poverty (one 
dollar a day). Consequently, under no circumstances 
should a development model be based solely on the 
financial contributions of emigrants.
Of course, this does not mean that remittances 
cannot be used to spur development. On the contrary, 
the accrued experience of international good practices 
TABLE 6
Colombia: potential effects of remittances
Affected sector Positive effects Negative effects
Domestic demand • Multiplier effect on GDP through consumption • Demand is heavily focused on non-productive
 • Reactivation of construction sector  spending
 • Development of remittance-related activities • Economic activity is sensitive to changes in
 • Support for investment (particularly microenterprises)  migratory cycles 
Current account • Improvement in current account through  • Increased imports as a result of ostentation and
  balance of invisibles   imitation 
   • Loss of competitiveness as a result of currency
    appreciation (risk of Dutch disease)
Labour market • Higher reservation wage • No incentive to work (culture of idleness)
 • Higher real wages (due to reduced labour supply)
 • Lower unemployment (fewer people looking for work)
Prices • Imported disinflation (due to appreciation of currency) • Increase in money supply
   • Increased demand for non-tradable goods
   • Higher production costs (due to increase 
    in real wages)
Financial system • Increased functional efficiency (more competition  • Risk of money laundering
  between financial intermediaries)
 • Increased bankarization among remittance recipients
Public  finance • Increased tax revenue • Moral hazard (growing public debt)
 • Lower social expenditure
 • Lighter debt burden (greater access to international 
  financing)
Human and social capital • Increased investment in education and health care • Collateral problems:  brain drain and break-up
 • Organization of emigrant networks for the sending   of families
  of collective remittances 
Poverty and inequality • Reduced poverty • Increased social and geographic inequality
 • Steady income for retirees • Strong financial dependence on the part of
 • Funding of social projects by emigrant associations  recipient households
   • Risk of reduced social spending (remittances 
    take its place)
Source: Independent research by the author.
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IV
Conclusions
In Colombia today, there is a tendency to view 
migration as a public-policy tool. The departure of part 
of the country’s workforce is, in effect, a safety valve 
that allows the State to ignore its economic and social 
responsibilities. Migration does reduce unemployment, 
and remittances help to stimulate economic activity 
and improve the balance on current account. The 
government should not view it as a solution to the 
country’s problems, however. While there is reason to 
encourage migration (to export problems, so to speak), 
internal solutions must also be found. The reduction 
of unemployment should be the result of an active 
job-creation policy, not of the mass departure of the 
unemployed.
While the government should strive to reduce 
remittance costs, promote financial democracy and 
steer remittances towards investment in production, it 
should not be forgotten that the key to development lies 
in domestic structural reforms. The experience of other 
countries has shown that, generally speaking, migration 
is not a development solution. Some countries, such 
as Morocco, Algeria and even Mexico, have received 
remittances for decades and yet have failed to offer 
their people viable development options. Migration 
has thus become a perverse process, creating “poverty 
traps” whereby flawed economic and social policies 
lead to increased migration to industrialized countries, 
which in turn makes it so governments do not feel the 
need to undertake the types of reforms required to 
overcome underdevelopment. In contrast, countries that 
have successfully jump-started their economies have 
all carried out profound reforms. The achievements 
of Ireland, Spain or the Republic of Korea cannot be 
attributed to the massive outflow of migrants they 
experienced at a given time in their history, but rather 
to sound development policies. As a result, these 
countries, which used to be exporters of manpower, 
are now net receivers of migrants.
Such a transformation calls for a reorientation of 
economic and social policy. Economic growth must 
be a priority for the Colombian government; this is a 
sine qua non if the country is to retain its workforce. 
Increased efforts are needed in terms of agricultural, 
industrial and employment policy, as well as investment 
in research and development and in human capital. 
Social expenditure must also be a priority, since there 
is an inverse relationship between social spending and 
the migration rate (Khoudour-Castéras, 2007b). This 
will require a redistributive policy, which will in turn 
entail tax reforms aimed at improving social justice. 
It is also time for Colombia to consider affirmative 
action policies for the benefit of the most vulnerable 
sectors of society.
(Original: Spanish)
21 The consular identity card is issued by Colombian consular 
offices in the United States (Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston, 
Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco and Washington, 
D.C.) and is recognized by numerous public and private entities in 
that country. The card, which includes several features designed to 
prevent forgery, is a bilingual document that includes a photograph 
of the bearer and lists his or her city of origin, age and address, as 
well as the consular office that issued the card, its date of issuance 
and expiry and its registration number. The main advantage of the 
card is that it contains no information on the bearer’s immigration 
status and allows migrants whose status is irregular to open a bank 
account at their place of residence.
should be put to use in Colombia in order to adopt 
public policies that take advantage of this “financial 
manna”. The abolishment of the tax-at-source on 
international transfers, the creation of a consular 
identity card in the United States,21 the organization of 
several housing fairs in the United States and Spain, 
and the development by the Colombian National 
Education System (sne) of virtual training courses 
for Colombians living abroad are all steps in the right 
direction. In any event, remittances should clearly 
not be an objective but rather an instrument of public 
policy. It should not be forgotten that remittances 
belong to migrants and their families; they are the 
result of much effort and sacrifice, and it would be a 
mistake to think that the State could take ownership 
of them.
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